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Abstract

A Virtual Private Network is a wide spread technology for connecting remote users and
locations to the main core network. It has number of benefits such as cost-efficiency and
security. SSL and IPSec are the most popular VPN protocols employed by large number of
organizations. Each protocol has its benefits and disadvantages. Simultaneous SSL and IPSec
implementation delivers efficient and flexible solution for companies’ with heterogeneous
remote connection needs. On the other hand, employing two different VPN technologies opens
questions about compatibility, performance, and drawbacks especially if they are utilized by one
network device.
The study examines the behavior of the two VPN protocols implemented in one edge
network device, ASA 5510 security appliance. It follows the configuration process as well as the
effect of the VPN protocols on the ASA performance including routing functions, firewall access
lists, and network address translation abilities. The paper also presents the cost effect and the
maintenance requirements for utilizing SSL and IPSec in one edge network security device.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a set of technologies that extend an organization’s
private network to include remote offices, business partners, telecommuters, and mobile workers.
It is an IP-based model that uses encryption and tunneling over a public network (Internet) to
connect securely remote users and branch offices to their corporate network. A VPN connection
can be presented as a pipe carrying encapsulated private data through a public network.
Travelling agents, home workers, and several remote offices is a common scenario for
large businesses. To communicate and perform in efficient way all these remote sites need a
connection to the main network. Moreover, they need to communicate in secure and confidential
manner. VPN has several advantages over the competitive options such as leased lines and Dialups. It is considerably more cost-effective than a leased line although it cannot offer the same
low latency and line capacity. It depends on a business needs whether to use VPN or leased line.
Compared to Dial-up, VPN is more cost-effective and a more secure way to connect remote
users. As Diab et al. (2007) state in their paper, VPN is considered the strongest security solution
for remote communications over the Internet. It includes cryptographic protocols to assure
confidentiality of data, authentication and authorization procedures to identify users, and
message control to provide integrity of data.
To make the decision to implement VPN as a remote communication technology is the
first and the easiest step preceding numerous consideration and issues to be solved. There are
several questions that need answers before starting a VPN deployment. What are the various
types of VPN available? Which one best fits the corporate network remote access requirements?
How does it affect application performance when they are accessed remotely? Is one VPN
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technology able to fulfill all the company’s various requirements for remote connection? The
answer of the last question is the motivation behind the research in this paper.
IPSec satisfies the permanent, always-on VPN access requirement. It provides access to
all network resources including VoIP through a single log-in. Corporation offices need fullservice and secure network access available on the IPSec tunnel. Moreover, all servers and
clients are part of the business network and they can be managed, configured, and maintained by
the corporate IT department. SSL, on the other hand, is suitable for mobile workers that need
occasional, on-demand access to the main network resources usually through public terminals.
SSL is logical solution for business partners and customers who are out of reach of the IT staff.
Simple browser with SSL capabilities is enough for their network access needs.
Both IPSec and SSL have their advantages and limitations. They are effective,
standardized, and secure choices for granting remote access. Simultaneous implementation can
grant scalability of access levels and flexibility for IT administrators to effectively manage the
different levels of remote connections.
IPSec and SSL VPNs can be implemented with software installed on a server acting as a
gateway or as hardware modules included or separately added to edge routers. IPSec modules
have been part of most commercial routers for years. To address the growing popularity of SSL
VPN and the cost issues associated with both technologies deployed in one network,
manufacturers release devices that include SSL in addition to IPSec VPN making simultaneous
implementation easier and more affordable. Leaders in network technologies like Cisco and
Netgear are the first to offer such products on the market. Utilizing both protocols in one device
is a new approach that opens questions about SSL and IPSec VPNs working simultaneously in
one edge router. The study intends to explore the behavior of an edge security appliance that
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includes VPN modules. IPSec and SSL VPN technologies can be enabled and configured in one
edge router without causing network performance issues or creating conflicts in router
configuration.
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Chapter 2 – Review of Literature and Research Objectives

The literature available for IPSec and SSL VPN protocols is fairly large, but it is not in
the subject of both technologies working simultaneously in one edge network device. There are
numerous articles and research papers considering which protocol is suitable for certain situation
and what are the security issues applicable for each VPN technology. There are number of papers
that discuss the benefits of mix-and-match various protocols but they do not go in details of how
they work together and what the possible issues are when these protocols are implemented in the
same computer network.
Martin Heller (2006) follows the path of VPNs from their beginning as trusted networks
(leased lines) to today’s secure private lines over public packed-switched network, the Internet.
He describes several VPN protocols such as L2TP, IPSec, IPSec over L2TP, SSL, TLS as well as
the benefits and the security risks they expose. Heller defines two problems in combining two
different VPN technologies. First, he states that combining the use of two VPN technologies
simultaneously can expose the company’s network to the outside world and make it vulnerable to
intruders. Second, there is an issue that comes from the network address translation (NAT)
technology. SSL/TLS can work and should work through NAT-based firewall while site-to-site
IPSec should bypass the NAT translation. Since the study proposes the use of IPSec and SSL in
one front edge device (edge router) both protocols will be filtered through the same firewall
making the issue significant for the research.
Frankel et al. (2008) from the National Institute of Standards and Technology provides a
detailed guide to SSL VPNs including explanation of every step from identifying the needs of
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VPN to deployment and management of the virtual network. The authors suggest that a company
should produce technical documentation in the deployment phase to address the following issues:
1. Encrypted traffic can affect firewalls, IDS (intrusion detection system), QoS (quality
of service), and congestion control.
2. Access policies may block SSL traffic in firewalls and routers.
3. Unexpected performance issues may arise from the overhead of the SSL packets.
The paper includes a case study in which a company implements a SSL VPN appliance
while at the same time leaves IPSec tunnels to some of its remote resources. The study does not
consider any impact of SSL on the IPSec performance and configuration. On the other hand, the
issues above suggest the opposite as the IPSec traffic is filtered by the same firewalls and access
policies which have to distinguish between the two protocols. Frankel et al. (2008) as well as the
National Webcast Initiative (2005) consider IPSec and SSL to be complimentary VPN
technologies but do not provide any details of how they can be implemented simultaneously.
As most of the articles about SSL and IPSec, Michael Daye Jr. (2007) compares the two
protocols based on several different parameters: encryption, accessibility, complexity,
scalability, cost, and so on. He concludes that each VPN has its strengths and weaknesses and
using SSL or IPSec depends on a certain scenario. He mentions that deploying both of them is
possible but the cost factor puts only one of them in favor over the other. Arif Basha (2005)
presents a cost comparison in his article that claims that the cost is equal for an organization with
100 users or more. The cost factor is very important and it presents the non-technical side of the
two VPN technologies working simultaneously. Cost considerations explained in the articles are
not an issue on the market today as most of the network equipment vendors include SSL and
IPSec modules in their network gear. Another point that Basha mentions is the maintenance and
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use factors. He states that SSL VPN is significantly ahead of IPSec in that aspect as it requires
less time for maintenance and support from the network administrator. The study includes the
maintenance factor as one of the parameters to be explored.
The study on SSL and IPSec simultaneous implementation takes place in small country
club that uses Cisco network equipment and specifically Cisco ASA5510 VPN edition edge
router. Cisco is one of the leaders in providing network solutions. Heary (2009) presents a
comparison between top vendors in several different areas. The statistics in his article are based
on Infonetics Network IDS/IPS Market Share Q3 CY’09. Cisco takes third position in the SSL
VPN market after Juniper and Checkpoint. On the other hand, the company is a leader in
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Security Appliances, and Integrated Security (i.e. secure
routers). The results provided by Infonetics confirm the presence of Cisco products in large
number of business networks worldwide meaning the study can have positive and informative
effect in the VPN community.
Cisco introduces ASA 5500 Series SSL/IPSec VPN edition in their Web page as a single
platform that delivers customizable, simple, and flexible VPN solution that eliminate the cost of
deploying multiple, parallel remote-access connections. It offers client and clientless VPN as
well as the standard routing and firewall capabilities. Richard Deal (2005) compares the ASA
5500 capabilities to the other Cisco VPN options like Cisco VPN 3000 concentrators and IOSbased routers. ASA and respectively PIX series have been designed for network address
translation (NAS) and they can handle complex translation polices such as bidirectional NAT on
multi-interfaced router. Stateful firewall services are main strength of the ASA appliance. It
includes application layer inspection in addition to the basic firewall filtering.
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The following table presents features of Cisco ASA5510 and ASA5505 which are used in
the study.
Table 2.1. Specifications of Cisco ASA 5505 and ASA 5510 Security Appliance Models
Platform

Cisco ASA 5505

Cisco ASA 5510

Maximum VPN
throughput

100 Mbps

170 Mbps

Maximum concurrent
SSL VPN sessions

25

250

25

250

Maximum concurrent
IPsec VPN sessions
Interfaces

Stateful failover
Profile
VPN load balancing

8-port 10/100 switch

5 Fast Ethernet

2 Power over Ethernet ports

2 Gigabit Ethernet

4 - SFP (with 4GE SSM)

3 Fast Ethernet

No
Desktop
No

Licensed feature
1-RU
Licensed feature

Shared VPN
License Option

No

Yes
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From the perspective provided by the articles and the papers discussed above, the present
study is made with some specific objectives. The objectives of the study are as follows:
1. Install and configure SSL and IPSec VPN connections on Cisco ASA 5500 Series.
2. Identify if there are any issues in router’s configuration file such as ACL and firewall
rules that are in conflict because of the two VPNs running together.
3. Capture and analyze network packets via Wireshark or dSniff to identify possible
overhead and conflicting headers.
4. Analyze data flow going through the ASA VPN appliance and compare it with both
VPN technologies running simultaneously and only IPSec enabled on the VPN router.
Analyze router’s performance under the different scenarios.
5. Identify if data coming from VPN tunnel and data coming from Internet is routed
correctly to reach the final destination.
6. Identify if IPSec and SSL VPNs are running simultaneously without causing conflicts
in the edge VPN router.
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Chapter 3 – Methodology

Experimental Environment
The research will take place in a real network environment at a private golf club that
includes a main facility, several close remote locations, and employees connecting to the club’s
network resources from home. A sister ski club located 15 miles away in the mountains is
included in main club’s network through VPN.
The club’s lodge houses all servers and main network. The following figures show the
network configuration at both locations before implementing SSL and IPSec VPNs.
Golf Club WAN/LAN Topology
and IP Usage
Roaring Fork Club

WindRose BasAdmin Building

Wireless LAN Bridge

LAN GW
192.168.1.254

ASA
vpn.rfclub.com
173.8.229.17
192.168.1.1

Wireless LAN Bridge

Comcast

Future Qwest DSL
Exchange
mail.rfclub.com
173.8.229.19
192.168.1.207

RFC River Cabin

Golf Maintenance Building

Barracuda
b.rfclub.com
173.8.229.18
192.168.1.253

Wireless LAN Bridge
Cisco Hardware
No QoS – dropped calls
Internet

Terminal Server
terminal.rfclub.com
173.8.229.20
192.168.1.206
Guest = 173.8.229.21

Jonas Web Porthole
 DNS and MX:
 rfclub.com
 rflodging.com
 rfmountainclub.com
 windrose.com

Comcast Details:
IP: 173.8.229.17 – 21
Sub: 255.255.255.248
GW: 173.8.229.22
DNS1: 68.87.85.98
DNS2: 68.87.69.146

Figure 3.1.1. Network topology of Club’s main facility

IP confirmation to allow
Jonas in. (173.8.229.19)
Port :8080
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Figure 3.1.2. Network topology of Club’s remote location
The network configuration does not include IPSec tunnel or SSL VPN. The main facility
connects to the Internet through Comcast Cable Modem and to its close locations (administration
and golf maintenance building and river cabin) through wireless LAN bridges. Routing and
security are maintained by ASA 5510 firewall router. Club’s remote location connects to Internet
with Qwest DSL modem and uses Cisco 1811 for routing and security. In order to conduct the
study an IPSec tunnel between the two clubs will be enabled and configured as well as clientless
SSL VPN on the ASA security appliance at the lodge network. To avoid compatibility issues and
for better network utilization ASA 5505 will be added to the edge of a remote location’s
network. The following figures present the topology of the two networks after the changes made
to allow SSL and IPSec implementation. There are additional changes that do not concern the
study although they improve the network performance and reliability.
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Figure 3.1.3. Club’s network topology after building the IPSec tunnels.

Figure 3.1.4. Remote location’s network topology with ASA firewall router.

11
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Changes in the main club network include two IPSec VPN tunnels that replace the
unreliable wireless bridge connections to the administration building and the river cabin. An
additional IPSec tunnel connects the remote mountain location to the golf club. The tunnel is
configured between golf club’s ASA5510 and mountain club’s newly installed ASA5505
firewall appliance. A Comcast subscription (set as primary Internet connection) assures
redundancy set as failover procedure in the ASA5505. SSL Clientless VPN is configured on
main club’s ASA router to allow employees to connect to certain network resources from home.
IPSec VPN Configuration
Cisco ASDM-IDM module provides convenient user interface to configure the IPSec
tunnel on Cisco ASA5510 and ASA5505. The following screenshots present the IPSec
configuration on the mountain club’s ASA appliance.

Figure 3.2.1. Basic IPSec configuration.
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The figure shows that the IPSec tunnel connects networks 192.168.1.0 (golf club) and
192.168.4.0 (mountain club) using pre-shared key for authentication, 168-bit Triple DES (3des)
encryption mechanism, and SHA hash policy to ensure integrity.

Figure 3.2.2. IPSec crypto maps.
The crypto map specifies Diffie-Hellman Group 2 which uses 1024-bit encryption to
derive the shared secret. It also defines the connection type as bi-directional and the crypto map
lifetime to 8 hours which is the default value in ASA to assure secure ISAKMP negotiations.
Network address translation traversal (NAT-T) is enabled to allow the IPSec data through the
NAT devices.
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Figure 3.2.3. IPSec IKE settings.
IKE keepalives is enabled to identify any connection failure between the two hosts.

Figure 3.2.4. Access Control Lists for IPSec tunnel.
Access control list (ACL) assigned to the IPSec crypto map identifies the traffic between
the two subnets, 192.168.1.0 and 192.168.4.0. The access rule allows network traffic to pass
through the IPSec tunnel without being blocked by the firewall.
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Main lodge’s ASA5510 has the same IPSec configuration: pre-shared key for
authentication, 168-bit 3DES encryption mechanism, and SHA hash policy for data integrity. In
addition to the VPN between the golf and the ski club, ASA5510 utilizes two more IPSec tunnels
to connect two close locations, the River Cabin and the administration building. The IPSec
tunnel configured through the Cisco ASDM-IDM appears in router’s configuration file as shown
on the figures below.
interface Ethernet0/1
nameif COMCAST
security-level 0
ip address 173.8.229.17 255.255.255.248
!
tunnel-group 75.145.121.41 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 75.145.121.41 ipsec-attributes
pre-shared-key *
tunnel-group 173.164.39.77 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 173.164.39.77 ipsec-attributes
pre-shared-key *
tunnel-group RFCLUB-EZVPN type remote-access
tunnel-group RFCLUB-EZVPN general-attributes
address-pool EZVPN-POOL
default-group-policy RFCLUB-EZVPN
tunnel-group RFCLUB-EZVPN ipsec-attributes
pre-shared-key *
tunnel-group 173.14.13.25 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 173.14.13.25 ipsec-attributes
pre-shared-key *
!
crypto isakmp identity address
crypto isakmp enable COMCAST
crypto isakmp policy 10
authentication pre-share
encryption 3des
hash sha
group 2
lifetime 86400
Figure 3.2.5. Part of the ASA5510 configuration file showing the IPSec tunnels and their
configuration.
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access-list COMCAST_cryptomap extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
10.100.10.0 255.255.254.0
access-list RFCLUB_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
10.100.10.0 255.255.254.0
access-list RFCLUB_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
10.255.255.0 255.255.255.0
access-list RFCLUB_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0
access-list RFCLUB_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0
access-list COMCAST_2_cryptomap extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0
access-list OUTSIDE_cryptomap extended permit ip any 10.255.255.0 255.255.255.0
access-list Split_Tunnel_ACL standard permit 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
access-list COMCAST_access_in extended permit tcp any host 173.8.229.17 eq 200
access-list COMCAST_access_in extended permit tcp any host 173.8.229.17 eq 212
access-list COMCAST_3_cryptomap extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0
Figure 3.2.6. Part of ASA5510 configuration file showing ACL rules.
Figure 9 and 10 show only that part of the configuration part that concerns the IPSec
tunnels. The full running configuration file of ASA5510 is included in Appendix A. All three
tunnels are configured on the Comcast Ethernet interface 0/1 which holds five different static IP
addresses with subnet mask 255.255.255.248 assigned from the ISP. Access lists allow the home
network, 192.168.1.0 to identify traffic from the remote ones 10.100.10.0, 10.255.255.0,
192.168.100.0, and ski club’s 192.168.4.0.
AnyConnect SSL VPN Configuration
Clientless SSL VPN is advertised as a remote connection that does not need a VPN client
installed on user’s computer to build a secure tunnel. That connection requires only SSL-enabled
browser to access data through https, ftp, or CIFS protocols. The clientless VPN provides very
limited access which is insufficient for the club’s needs. ASA 5510 offers SSL AnyConnect
VPN through a small client (SVC) that is installed on the remote work station and can be
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removed after the secure session is terminated. SVC allows users to access all resources on the
network based on their credentials. Installing SVC does not require the network administrator to
have access to user’s computer. The following figures show the steps taken to configure SSL
VPN on the ASA 5510 appliance.

Figure 3.3.1. Enable SSL VPN as an alias to existing group policy.
Current ASA configuration allows using the preexisting connection profile RFCLUB
EZVPN to enable the SSL VPN. Authentication uses the local AAA server group, the address
pool is inherited from EZVPN-POOL, and the SSL VPN client protocol is enabled for that
profile. Detailed information about RFCLUB-EZVPN and EZVPN-POOL is provided in the full
ASA running configuration file in Appendix A.
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Figure 12 contains a screenshot from the ASDM interface presenting the SSL VPN
enabled as RFCLUB-EZVPN alias with AAA local authentication attached to the COMCAST
interface of the ASA router.

Figure 3.3.2. SSL VPN configuration overview.
Procedures
VPN tunnels verification. The first step after configuring the IPSec and SSL on the
ASA appliances is to verify that the router is able to build the remote connections. To test the
SSL VPN we use a laptop connected to Internet through a Verizon wireless card. The public IP
address assigned to the outside interface of ASA has a DNS record vpn.rfclub.com. The
following figures present the SSL VPN interface showing in the user’s Web browser and the
connection details after downloading and installing the SVC.
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Figure 3.4.1. SSL VPN login page.

Figure 3.4.2. SSL VPN client information.
Statistics presented in figure 14 confirm that the SSL tunnel is running. The client has an
internal IP assigned from the ASA’s DHCP server and uses RSA in combination with AES128
and SHA1 for data encryption/ decryption. Monitoring information from the ASDM also
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confirms the SSL connection as well as the IPSec tunnel between the mountain and the golf
clubs and between the administration building and the golf club.

Figure 3.4.3. Information from the ASDM software, confirming the IPSec and the SSL VPN
sessions.
Monitoring Information. A quantitative approach will help in monitoring and gathering
data about the IPSec and SSL tunnels while running simultaneous sessions through the ASA
appliance. Cisco’s ASDM software provides extensive information about the ASA router that
can be used to analyze its behavior while utilizing VPN sessions. Monitoring diagrams include
RAM and CPU load, dropped packets, queued packets, IPSec session statistics, SSL session
statistics, and error and warning messages during the sessions. The monitoring statistics will
discover if the ASA appliance is able to support both VPN tunnel without disturbing any of its
normal functions.
Running Configuration File Analysis. Configuration file analysis will compare the file
before and after enabling the SSL protocol on the ASA device. It will identify if there are any
conflicts in the access control list (ACL) configuration. We will also use the ASDM to find if
there are any warnings or errors in the router configuration file.
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WireShark Packet Monitoring. Packet monitoring will provide information of how the
ASA appliance tag packets assigned to the SSL tunnel and to the IPSec tunnel. That information
will discover if the router is able to tag VPN packet correctly for the different session and
respectively if the router can handle the different protocols at the same time.
Cost Factors. SSL and IPSec sessions require licenses that affect the company’s budget.
It is a non-technical factor that also identifies if the two protocols can be implemented
simultaneously. Data will be gathered about license cost and will be compared to other VPN
solutions to provide objective information about the cost effect of running IPSec and SSL
simultaneously.
Maintenance Requirements and Statistics. The time frame for configuring and
maintaining the different VPN protocols will be measured to identify how they affect the
network administrator’s work load. It is additional information to show if administrators are able
to support both protocols without affecting their normal work flow.
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Chapter 4 – Project Results and Analysis

ASDM ASA Monitoring
ASA Resource and Interface Graphs with Two IPSec Tunnels. Figures 4.1.1 through
4.1.12 present graphs acquired from the ASDM software. ASDM monitoring includes
information about the ASA appliance while running two simultaneous IPSec tunnels. All
sessions are loaded with bulk data transfer which is the primary use of the remote connections.

Figure 4.1.1. CPU and RAM usage with two IPSec tunnels.
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Figure 4.1.2. Dropped packets and packet errors graphs with two IPSec tunnels.
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Figure 4.1.3. Input queue and collision counts graph with two IPSec tunnels.
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ASA Resource and Interface Graphs with One SSL and Two IPSec Sessions. This
section shows the same ASA statistics while utilizing a SSL session on top of the two IPSec
tunnels. All VPN tunnels are loaded with bulk data transfer which is the primary use for the
remote connections.

Figure 4.1.4. CPU and RAM usage with two IPSec and one SSL session.
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Figure 4.1.5. Packet counts vs. drop packet with two IPSec and one SSL session.
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Figure 4.1.6. Packer errors and collision counts with two IPSec and one SSL session.
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Figure 4.1.7. Packet input queue vs. output queue with two IPSec and one SSL session.
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VPN Session Statistics. This part includes IPSec and SSL session statistics as well as
global encryption statistics for the two VPN technologies for the time they have been working
simultaneously.

Figure 4.1.8. Details for the IPSec session between the mountain club and the golf club.
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Figure 4.1.9. Details for the SSL session between employee laptop and the golf club.
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Figure 4.1.10. IKE protocol crypto statistics.

Figure 4.1.11. IPSec protocol crypto statistics.
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Figure 4.1.12. SSL protocol crypto statistics.
Analysis. Figures 4.1.1 and 4.1.4 compare the ASA router resource usage while running
two IPSec tunnels and a SSL session in addition to the tunnels. A slight change can be seen only
in the CPU diagram and it is negligible as the CPU usage increase with only 1%. We also take in
account that ASA 5510 is rated to support 250 IPSec and 250 SSL sessions. Running large
number of concurrent VPN session is a matter of hardware upgrade and not the two technologies
implemented together. SSL and IPSec running simultaneously do not affect the ASA hardware
resources.
Figures 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.1.5, 4.1.6, and 4.1.7 identify the effect of the VPN sessions on the
overall ASA performance. In normal work conditions, with two IPSec tunnels in idle mode and
no SSL session, the outside interface (Comcast) drops around 2100 from the approximately
320000 incoming packets. In addition, for the time interval of two hours (intervals of 5 minutes
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are shown in the graphs due to ASDM configuration) there are no collisions or packet errors. The
statistics does not change when SSL session is running and IPSec tunnels are loaded with data
transfer. During the increased packet processing through the Comcast interface, the number of
dropped or error packets stays unchanged. SSL and IPSec have a zero effect on the input and
output queue as well as on the overall performance of the ASA security appliance.
Figures 4.1.8 and 4.1.9 provide statistics for the IPSec session between the two clubs and
the SSL session between the employee laptop and the club. Sessions are built according to the
associated crypto maps with the correct encryption protocols and valid IPs assigned by the
DHCP server. The statistics does not identify any dropped packets or incorrect parameters for the
both sessions. In addition, figures 4.1.10, 4.1.11, and 4.1.12 show zero failures from the millions
of encrypt packet requests. IPSec and SSL sessions are built and utilized simultaneously without
packet or request failures. The following figure includes real time log information from the
ASDM that confirms the IPSec and SSL flawless simultaneous existence.

6|Feb 15 2011|13:01:58|302020|10.255.255.101|1280|RFCSERVER|0|Built inbound ICMP
connection for faddr 10.255.255.101/1280 gaddr RFCSERVER/0 laddr RFCSERVER/0
(sfink)
6|Feb 15 2011|13:01:58|605005|RFCSERVER|31913|192.168.1.1|https|Login permitted from
RFCSERVER/31913 to INSIDE-RFCLUB:192.168.1.1/https for user "admin"
6|Feb 15 2011|13:01:58|611101|||||User authentication succeeded: Uname: admin
6|Feb 15 2011|13:01:58|113008|||||AAA transaction status ACCEPT : user = admin
6|Feb 15 2011|13:01:58|113012|||||AAA user authentication Successful : local database : user
= admin
6|Feb 15 2011|13:01:58|725002|RFCSERVER|31913|||Device completed SSL handshake
with client INSIDE-RFCLUB:RFCSERVER/31913
6|Feb 15 2011|13:01:58|725003|RFCSERVER|31913|||SSL client INSIDE
RFCLUB:RFCSERVER/31913 request to resume previous session.
6|Feb 15 2011|13:01:58|725001|RFCSERVER|31913|||Starting SSL handshake with client
INSIDE-RFCLUB:RFCSERVER/31913 for TLSv1 session.

Figure 4.1.13. Real-time log: SSL handshake process.
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6|Feb 15 2011|13:02:22|302020|10.255.255.101|1280|RFCSERVER|0|Built inbound ICMP
connection for faddr 10.255.255.101/1280 gaddr RFCSERVER/0 laddr RFCSERVER/0
(sfink)
6|Feb 15 2011|13:02:22|302014|192.168.4.15|1619|192.168.1.210|8889|Teardown TCP
connection 18492859 for COMCAST:192.168.4.15/1619 to INSIDE
RFCLUB:192.168.1.210/8889 duration 0:00:00 bytes 683 TCP FINs
6|Feb 15 2011|13:02:21|302021|10.255.255.101|1280|RFCSERVER|0|Teardown ICMP
connection for faddr 10.255.255.101/1280 gaddr RFCSERVER/0 laddr RFCSERVER/0
(sfink)
6|Feb 15 2011|13:02:21|302014|192.168.4.15|80|192.168.1.210|4264|Teardown TCP
connection 18492858 for COMCAST:192.168.4.15/80 to INSIDE
RFCLUB:192.168.1.210/4264 duration 0:00:00 bytes 1059 TCP FINs
6|Feb 15 2011|13:02:21|302020|10.255.255.101|1280|RFCSERVER|0|Built inbound ICMP
connection for faddr 10.255.255.101/1280 gaddr RFCSERVER/0 laddr RFCSERVER/0
(sfink)
6|Feb 15 2011|13:02:21|302013|192.168.4.15|1619|192.168.1.210|8889|Built inbound TCP
connection 18492859 for COMCAST:192.168.4.15/1619 (192.168.4.15/1619) to INSIDE
RFCLUB:192.168.1.210/8889 (192.168.1.210/8889)
6|Feb 15 2011|13:02:21|302014|192.168.4.15|80|192.168.1.210|4263|Teardown TCP
connection 18492856 for COMCAST:192.168.4.15/80 to INSIDE
RFCLUB:192.168.1.210/4263 duration 0:00:01 bytes 1032 TCP FINs
6|Feb 15 2011|13:02:20|302021|10.255.255.101|1280|RFCSERVER|0|Teardown ICMP
connection for faddr 10.255.255.101/1280 gaddr RFCSERVER/0 laddr RFCSERVER/0
(sfink)
6|Feb 15 2011|13:02:20|302013|192.168.1.210|4264|192.168.4.15|80|Built outbound TCP
connection 18492858 for COMCAST:192.168.4.15/80 (192.168.4.15/80) to INSIDE
RFCLUB:192.168.1.210/4264 (192.168.1.210/4264)

Figure 4.1.14. Real-time log: IPSec and SSL requests.
An IPSec tunnel exists between the mountain club network, 192.168.4.0 and the golf club
network 192.168.1.0. An SSL session is on the 10.255.255.0 network. Both connections accept
and send messages to the correct destination generating no errors or warnings.
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ASA Configuration
Enabling the SSL VPN changes the ASA configuration files by adding few lines that
define the SSL protocol (Figure 4.2). The VPN is enabled on the Comcast interface and the path
to the SSL client is “disk0:/anyconnect-dart-win-2.5.2017-k9.pkg 1“.SSL is set as alias to
RFCLUB-EZVPN tunnel group. RFCLUB-EZVPN is a legacy group policy used for IPSec in
the past. The change appears in the policy-group attributes under “vpn-tunnel-protocol” where
the SSL VPN Client (svc) is added to the IPSec.
webvpn
enable COMCAST
svc image disk0:/anyconnect-dart-win-2.5.2017-k9.pkg 1
svc enable
tunnel-group-list enable
group-policy DfltGrpPolicy attributes
webvpn
url-list value RFC

group-policy RFCLUB-EZVPN attributes
wins-server value 192.168.1.207
dns-server value 192.168.1.207
vpn-tunnel-protocol IPSec svc
split-tunnel-policy tunnelspecified
split-tunnel-network-list value Split_Tunnel_ACL
default-domain value rfclub
nem enable
tunnel-group RFCLUB-EZVPN webvpn-attributes
group-alias SSLVPN enable

Figure 4.2. Changes in ASA configuration file after adding SSL.
Changes due to the SSL protocol in the configuration file do not reflect on the group
policy and the crypto-maps as it is able to use preexisting ones. VPNs are set to overpass the
ACL rules and adding SSL does not affect them either. In this configuration SSL and IPSec have
not interfering points in router’s configuration files. They avoid conflicting access control rules
and the ASA is able to process and route their packets correctly.
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Wireshark Packet Capture and Analysis
The purpose of packet analysis is to find how the ASA appliance process VPN traffic.
Different packets have to be properly encapsulated and decapsulated on both inside and outside
router interfaces with correct headers depending on the VPN protocol. The following figure
presents ingress traffic captured on the Comcast interface of the ASA appliance. The traffic is
from both SSL and IPSec sessions consequently captured by Wireshark. For better analysis
additional figures include detailed information about one packet of each VPN protocol.

220: 13:00:39.243258 173.8.229.17.443 > 75.196.229.54.3987: udp
1261
221: 13:00:39.243532 173.8.229.17.443 > 75.196.229.54.3987: udp
1261
222: 13:00:39.243761 173.8.229.17.443 > 75.196.229.54.3987: udp
973
223: 13:00:39.246401 75.196.229.54.3987 > 173.8.229.17.443: udp 93
224: 13:00:39.246477 75.196.229.54.3987 > 173.8.229.17.443: udp 93
225: 13:00:39.250505 173.164.39.77 > 173.8.229.17: ip-proto-50,
length 1452
226: 13:00:39.250872 173.164.39.77 > 173.8.229.17: ip-proto-50,
length 1452
227: 13:00:39.251314 173.164.39.77 > 173.8.229.17: ip-proto-50,
length 1452
228: 13:00:39.251802 173.8.229.17 > 173.164.39.77: ip-proto-50,
length 84
229: 13:00:39.252275 173.8.229.17 > 173.164.39.77: ip-proto-50,
length 84

Figure 4.3.1. Packets captured on Comcast ingress interface.
SSL session transfers data through the HTTPS protocol which is enabled in every Web
browser. The IP assigned to the outside interface on the club’s router is 173.8.229.17. Employee
laptop receives IP 75.196.229.54 from the Verizon wireless card. 443 is the HTTPS port that
sends data from the ASA appliance to the employee’s laptop on a random high port (3987 in our
case) encapsulated in UPD container. The IPSec tunnel between mountain club’s ASA 5505 and
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golf club’s ASA 5510 respectively with IPs 173.164.39.77 and 173.8.229.17 encapsulate data
with IP protocol 50. Protocol 50 identifies encapsulating security payload (ESP) which is a
member of the IPSec protocol suite.

Figure 4.3.2. Detailed information for SSL session: encapsulated frame No. 220.
The additional SSL frame information reveals that it a common Ethernet frame that
includes a UDP packet sent between two peers using the HTTPS protocol. It includes source and
destination MAC address, source and destination IP address, source and destination ports,
control data, and frame consequent number. The SSL session frame does not differ from a
common HTTPS frame and it is confirmed by the figures above.
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Figure 4.3.3. Detailed information for IPSec session: encapsulated frame No. 225.
IPSec tunnels transfer packets encapsulated in ESP container. The frame consists of
Ethernet, IP, and ESP protocols. ESP encapsulates the TCP and UDP protocols and they stay
transparent to the Ethernet frame. The frame contains information similar to the one in the SSL
frame differing only by the sequence number which is common for the TCP protocol.
The ASA routers produce and receive valid SSL and IPSec session frames with correct
encapsulation and valid headers. Packet sequence is strictly followed and it is not disturbed by
the two VPN protocols running simultaneous sessions.
The next figures depict the router’s decapsulation abilities i.e. the egress data from the
inside interface of the ASA appliance.
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3: 13:00:39.225940 192.168.1.207.445 > 10.255.255.101.3988: .
3369242874:3369244040(1166) ack 1489450167 win 64447
4: 13:00:39.226505 192.168.1.207.445 > 10.255.255.101.3988: .
3369244040:3369245206(1166) ack 1489450167 win 64447
5: 13:00:39.227023 192.168.1.207.445 > 10.255.255.101.3988: .
3369245206:3369246372(1166) ack 1489450167 win 64447
5668: 12:37:42.641705 192.168.1.207.5447 > 192.168.4.10.445: . ack
179053373 win 65535
5669: 12:37:42.642697 192.168.1.207.5447 > 192.168.4.10.445: . ack
179057513 win 65535
5670: 12:37:42.648510 192.168.1.207.5447 > 192.168.4.10.445: . ack
179060273 win 65535

Figure 4.3.4. Packets captured on ASA inside network interface.

Figure 4.3.5. Detailed information for SSL session: decapsulated frame No. 3.
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Figure 4.3.6. Detailed information for IPSec session: decapsulated frame No. 225.
Frames captured from the inside ASA interface have smaller size as the decapsulation
process removes IPSec and SSL headers and trailers used to transfer frames through the public
network. The IP protocol contains destination and source addresses of machines on the local
network and packets are ready to be routed to the designated destination. The captured SSL
packet carries data from reassembled Protocol Data Unit (PDU). The important information in
the frame is the IP destination and source address. 10.255.255.101 is the employee laptop IP
address assigned to the SSL client from the DHCP server. 192.168.1.207 is the club’s server
address. All information in the packet is correct meaning the decapsulation of the SSL packet is
successful and the packet can be processed further on the local network. Source and destination
IPs in the IPSec packet also confirm successful decapsulation as 192.168.1.207 and 192.168.4.10
are golf club and respectively mountain club server IP addresses.
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Decapsulation is applied simultaneously on IPSec and SSL session packets and the result
is valid data packets with correct LAN source and destination address as well as valid control
information. ASA appliance is able to correctly decapsulate simultaneously sent IPSec and SSL
packets.
VPN Maintenance Requirements
Setup and maintenance are important factors for both technologies to be utilized properly.
The table below identifies what is the time required to set up an IPSec site-to-site, IPSec remote
access, and SSL client VPNs. It also includes the times to add an IPSec tunnel, and to add a SSL
remote connection. ASDM software is the primary tool for ASA VPN configuration.
Table 4.1. Times to setup IPSec and SSL virtual networks
VPN \ Time
IPSec Site-to-Site

Time to Set Up
40 min (with matching devices)

Time to Resolve Issues
60 min

IPSec Remote Access

40 min

60 min

SSL AnyConnect

20 min

30 min

Add IPSec Remote Access

40 min

N/A

Add SSL AnyConnect

10 min

N/A

Times presented in the table are taken from an interview with the club’s network
administrator and from observation during the study that included VPN configuration and
maintenance. The approximate time to set up the IPSec tunnel between the ASA 5510 and ASA
5505 is 40 minutes. A previous attempt to establish an IPSec tunnel between ASA 5510 and
Cisco 1811 (before adding the ASA 5505) escalated to 2 hours and the tunnel was unstable and
unreliable. Matching devices is a plus that needs to be taken in account when configuring VPN
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connections. IPSec remote access takes the same amount of time as the VPN client has to be
installed and configured on a laptop. Having a desktop for remote connection requires the
administrator to visit the location which increases the overall time for configuration. Time for
additional IPSec connections do not differ from the time for basic setup as the same process
needs to be repeated again.
SSL AnyConnect requires configuration only on the main ASA appliance and the setup
time is less than the one for the IPSec. Resoling issues on the IPSec VPN connections is also
time-consuming considering the two locations that need to be examined. Additional SSL
connections are time consuming only if the user requires different credentials than the existing
ones. Creating new user with specific access restrictions takes 10 minutes out of the network
administrator’s time. SSL AnyConnect has the ability to completely replace the IPSec client for
traveling agents or working from home employees. With that in mind, maintaining SSL
AnyConnect and site-to-site VPNs reduce time to employ remote connections and respectively
increases administrator’s productivity. Simultaneous SSL and IPSec implementation optimizes
network administrator work and releases extra time for regular network maintenance jobs.
Cost Effect on Adding SSL VPN
The study is mainly focused on Cisco ASA 5510 security appliance and its ability to
support IPSec and SSL sessions simultaneously. The device is the second most inexpensive
model from the ASA family after the ASA 5505. It covers the connectivity needs of a small to
medium size organization such as the golf club where the study is conducted. According to Cisco
specifications the appliance is capable of 250 IPSec and 250 SSL concurrent sessions. By
contrasts with IPSec, SSL AnyConnect peers are subject of license purchase. The basic license
that comes with the ASA router allows 2 AnyConnect peers. Further levels include acquisition of
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10, 25, 50, 100, or 250 SSL peers. The following table contains SSL and IPSec cost for the
different number of connections. Prices are taken from CDW which is one of the biggest
providers for business IT solutions.
Table 4.2. SSL and IPSec cost per number of connections
Cost per number
Of VPN connections

SSL AnyConnect

IPSec

2

Included

Included

10

$772.99

Included

25

$2099.99

Included

50

$2469.99

Included

100

$4939.99

Included

250

$12349.99

Included

SSL license cost is affordable for a medium business but it is still not free as the IPSec
VPN. It should be pointed out that only basic IPSec setup is free. Use of 3DES and AES strong
encryption requires a license that worth $939.99 or almost the price for 10 SSL peers.
The computer network in the presented study is supported by one network administrator.
The current number of employees using remote connection is 12 which is comparatively low and
IPSec tunnels are manageable by one systems administrator. With the continuous development
of the ski club and the planned expansion of the golf club, the number of employees that will
require full, occasional remote connection tends to reach 30-35. That number of IPSec VPNs will
be overloading for one person and the 50 users SSL is the better solution for the case. Combining
IPSec and SSL requires more investments but the benefits overcome the price.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions

IPSec and SSL are two Virtual Private Network technologies that provide a cost-effective
and secure way to include remote locations to a main corporate network. They replace the
expensive leased lines with the common public network, the Internet. IPSec is the better solution
for site-to-site VPN. It provides more flexibility, more security, and more controllable network
environment for stationary remote locations. SSL is suitable for travelling agents or employees
working from home that need occasional, limited access to the organization’s network. Most
businesses regardless of their size include both of these elements, remote offices and remote
workers. Implementing IPSec and SSL simultaneously is the logical solution to meet
organizations’ heterogeneous remote connection needs.
Leading network equipment manufacturers like Cisco and Netgear respond to the market
needs with edge gear that allows simultaneous IPSec and SSL implementation. In terms of
affordability, edge router with VPN capabilities including remote peer licenses reach cost of
$4000. The price allows small and mid-size organization to include both VPN technologies in
their networks which was highly expensive in the past.
In terms of technical compatibility, SSL and IPSec are complementary technologies that
can be enabled in one network device. Evaluation of the experimental results from Cisco’s ASA
5510, show no issues with the two technologies working together. Device’s hardware is able to
utilize all sessions with minimal hardware load, without dropping packets, and without errors.
VPN sessions do not affect router’s performance.
The ASA security appliance is able to encapsulate, decapsulate, and route VPN packets
correctly maintaining stable SSL and IPSec connections. For a two-hour session of data transfer,
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there are zero failed requests, no packet errors, and no interference between the two protocols.
The DHCP server assigns correct IP addressed to the remote location through the VPN protocols
allowing correct routing functions before and after capsulation processes. Two hours is the
approximate time needed for a remote worker to use the SSL session to finish the daily tasks. It
is the actual period of time when the two VPN protocols run simultaneously.
VPN interacts tightly with other network functions such as QoS, NAT, and Firewalls.
SSL and IPSec functionality with these technologies is of a big concern in the study. The bottom
line is: there are no technical issues with the ASA router’s performance utilizing co-existing SSL
and IPSec through NAT-T and ACL rules. Correct implementation is subject of thorough
configuration of the security appliance and respectively administrator’s knowledge of these
technologies. Although, combination of SSL and IPSec reduces the workload on network
administrators, their simultaneous implementation requires substantial knowledge and deep
understanding of the VPN technologies.
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ASA 5510 Full Running Configuration File
Cryptochecksum: f525f2f2 95465b8e 274a9cd6 c3415371
: Saved
: Written by ***** at 15:34:37.292 MST Wed Feb 9 2011
!
ASA Version 8.0(4)
!
hostname edge
domain-name rfclub.com
enable password ***** encrypted
passwd ***** encrypted
names
name 192.168.1.207 RFCSERVER
name 192.168.1.206 TERMINALSERVER
name 192.168.1.54 Bellstaff
name 192.168.1.253 BARRACUDA
dns-guard
!
interface Ethernet0/0
description Inside Interface to the RFClub LAN
nameif INSIDE-RFCLUB
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0
!
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interface Ethernet0/1
nameif COMCAST
security-level 0
ip address 173.8.229.17 255.255.255.248
!
interface Ethernet0/2
description Interface to Guest networks
nameif GUEST
security-level 50
ip address 10.0.0.1 255.255.255.0
!
interface Ethernet0/3
shutdown
no nameif
security-level 0
no ip address
!
interface Management0/0
shutdown
nameif management
security-level 100
ip address 172.16.29.254 255.255.255.0
management-only
!
boot system disk0:/asa822-k8.bin
boot system disk0:/asa804-k8.bin
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ftp mode passive
clock timezone MST -7
clock summer-time MDT recurring
dns domain-lookup INSIDE-RFCLUB
dns server-group DefaultDNS
name-server RFCSERVER
name-server 216.237.77.2
domain-name rfclub.com
same-security-traffic permit inter-interface
same-security-traffic permit intra-interface
object-group network Jonas
network-object host 209.225.60.144
network-object host 209.225.60.145
network-object host 209.225.60.146
network-object host 209.225.60.147
network-object host 209.225.60.148
network-object host 209.225.60.149
network-object host 146.145.52.238
network-object host 206.186.126.226
object-group service BARRACUDA
service-object tcp eq *****
service-object tcp eq smtp
object-group service RFCSERVER
service-object tcp eq *****
service-object tcp eq www
service-object tcp eq https
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service-object tcp eq *****
object-group service TERMINALSERVER
service-object tcp eq *****
access-list COMCAST_cryptomap extended permit ip 192.168.1.0
255.255.255.0 10.100.10.0 255.255.254.0
access-list RFCLUB_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 192.168.1.0
255.255.255.0 10.100.10.0 255.255.254.0
access-list RFCLUB_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 192.168.1.0
255.255.255.0 10.255.255.0 255.255.255.0
access-list RFCLUB_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 192.168.1.0
255.255.255.0 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0
access-list RFCLUB_nat0_outbound extended permit ip 192.168.1.0
255.255.255.0 192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0
access-list COMCAST_2_cryptomap extended permit ip 192.168.1.0
255.255.255.0 192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0
access-list GUEST_access_in extended permit ip any any
access-list OUTSIDE_cryptomap extended permit ip any 10.255.255.0
255.255.255.0
access-list Split_Tunnel_ACL standard permit 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
access-list COMCAST_access_in extended permit object-group BARRACUDA
any host 173.8.229.18
access-list COMCAST_access_in extended permit object-group RFCSERVER
any host 173.8.229.19
access-list COMCAST_access_in extended permit object-group
TERMINALSERVER any host 173.8.229.20
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access-list COMCAST_access_in extended permit tcp any host
173.8.229.17 eq 200
access-list COMCAST_access_in extended permit tcp any host
173.8.229.17 eq 212
access-list COMCAST_3_cryptomap extended permit ip 192.168.1.0
255.255.255.0 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0
pager lines 24
logging enable
logging asdm informational
mtu INSIDE-RFCLUB 1500
mtu COMCAST 1500
mtu GUEST 1500
mtu management 1500
ip local pool EZVPN-POOL 10.255.255.101-10.255.255.200 mask
255.255.255.0
no failover
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1
icmp permit any INSIDE-RFCLUB
icmp permit any echo COMCAST
icmp permit any echo-reply COMCAST
asdm image disk0:/asdm-631.bin
no asdm history enable
arp timeout 14400
global (COMCAST) 1 interface
global (COMCAST) 2 173.8.229.21 netmask 255.255.0.0
nat (INSIDE-RFCLUB) 0 access-list RFCLUB_nat0_outbound
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nat (INSIDE-RFCLUB) 1 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0
nat (GUEST) 2 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0
static (INSIDE-RFCLUB,COMCAST) tcp interface 200 192.168.1.200 www
netmask 255.255.255.255
static (INSIDE-RFCLUB,COMCAST) 173.8.229.18 BARRACUDA netmask
255.255.255.255
static (INSIDE-RFCLUB,COMCAST) 173.8.229.19 RFCSERVER netmask
255.255.255.255
static (INSIDE-RFCLUB,COMCAST) 173.8.229.20 TERMINALSERVER netmask
255.255.255.255
access-group COMCAST_access_in in interface COMCAST
access-group GUEST_access_in in interface GUEST
route COMCAST 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 173.8.229.22 1
route INSIDE-RFCLUB 192.168.2.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.254 1
route INSIDE-RFCLUB 192.168.3.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.254 1
timeout xlate 3:00:00
timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02
timeout sunrpc 0:10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1:00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat
0:05:00
timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sipdisconnect 0:02:00
timeout sip-provisional-media 0:02:00 uauth 0:05:00 absolute
dynamic-access-policy-record DfltAccessPolicy
aaa authentication http console LOCAL
aaa authentication serial console LOCAL
aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL
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aaa authentication telnet console LOCAL
aaa authentication enable console LOCAL
http server enable
http 75.151.95.141 255.255.255.255 COMCAST
http 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 INSIDE-RFCLUB
http 172.16.29.0 255.255.255.0 management
http 173.14.13.25 255.255.255.255 COMCAST
no snmp-server location
no snmp-server contact
snmp-server enable traps snmp authentication linkup linkdown coldstart
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-3DES-MD5 esp-3des esp-md5-hmac
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-DES-SHA esp-des esp-sha-hmac
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-AES-128-SHA esp-aes esp-sha-hmac
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-AES-256-MD5 esp-aes-256 esp-md5-hmac
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-AES-256-SHA esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmac
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-AES-128-MD5 esp-aes esp-md5-hmac
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-AES-192-MD5 esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmac
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-AES-192-SHA esp-aes-192 esp-sha-hmac
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-DES-MD5 esp-des esp-md5-hmac
crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-3DES-SHA esp-3des esp-sha-hmac
crypto ipsec security-association lifetime seconds 28800
crypto ipsec security-association lifetime kilobytes 4608000
crypto dynamic-map OUTSIDE_dyn_map 20 set transform-set ESP-AES-128
SHA
crypto dynamic-map OUTSIDE_dyn_map 20 set security-association
lifetime seconds 28800
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crypto dynamic-map OUTSIDE_dyn_map 20 set security-association
lifetime kilobytes 4608000
crypto dynamic-map COMCAST_dyn_map 1 set pfs
crypto dynamic-map COMCAST_dyn_map 1 set transform-set ESP-AES-128-SHA
ESP-3DES-SHA ESP-3DES-MD5
crypto dynamic-map COMCAST_dyn_map 1 set security-association lifetime
seconds 28800
crypto dynamic-map COMCAST_dyn_map 1 set security-association lifetime
kilobytes 4608000
crypto map OUTSIDE_map 100 ipsec-isakmp dynamic OUTSIDE_dyn_map
crypto map COMCAST_map0 1 match address COMCAST_cryptomap
crypto map COMCAST_map0 1 set pfs
crypto map COMCAST_map0 1 set peer 75.145.121.41
crypto map COMCAST_map0 1 set transform-set ESP-3DES-SHA
crypto map COMCAST_map0 1 set security-association lifetime seconds
28800
crypto map COMCAST_map0 1 set security-association lifetime kilobytes
4608000
crypto map COMCAST_map0 2 match address COMCAST_2_cryptomap
crypto map COMCAST_map0 2 set pfs
crypto map COMCAST_map0 2 set peer 173.164.39.77
crypto map COMCAST_map0 2 set transform-set ESP-3DES-SHA
crypto map COMCAST_map0 2 set security-association lifetime seconds
28800
crypto map COMCAST_map0 2 set security-association lifetime kilobytes
4608000

Simultaneous SSL and IPSec Implementation
crypto map COMCAST_map0 3 match address COMCAST_3_cryptomap
crypto map COMCAST_map0 3 set peer 173.14.13.25
crypto map COMCAST_map0 3 set transform-set ESP-DES-MD5
crypto map COMCAST_map0 3 set security-association lifetime seconds
28800
crypto map COMCAST_map0 3 set security-association lifetime kilobytes
4608000
crypto map COMCAST_map0 65535 ipsec-isakmp dynamic COMCAST_dyn_map
crypto map COMCAST_map0 interface COMCAST
crypto isakmp identity address
crypto isakmp enable COMCAST
crypto isakmp policy 10
authentication pre-share
encryption 3des
hash sha
group 2
lifetime 86400
crypto isakmp policy 30
authentication pre-share
encryption aes
hash sha
group 2
lifetime 86400
crypto isakmp policy 50
authentication pre-share
encryption des
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hash md5
group 1
lifetime 86400
crypto isakmp ipsec-over-tcp port 10000
telnet 192.168.0.0 255.255.252.0 INSIDE-RFCLUB
telnet 172.16.29.0 255.255.255.0 management
telnet timeout 5
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 INSIDE-RFCLUB
ssh 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 COMCAST
ssh 172.16.29.0 255.255.255.0 management
ssh timeout 5
console timeout 0
management-access INSIDE-RFCLUB
dhcpd address 10.0.0.101-10.0.0.200 GUEST
dhcpd dns 216.237.77.2 205.171.3.65 interface GUEST
dhcpd lease 28800 interface GUEST
dhcpd domain rflcub.com interface GUEST
dhcpd enable GUEST
!
dhcpd address 172.16.29.1-172.16.29.5 management
dhcpd enable management
!
threat-detection basic-threat
threat-detection statistics access-list
no threat-detection statistics tcp-intercept
ntp server 192.43.244.18 source INSIDE-RFCLUB prefer
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webvpn
enable COMCAST
svc image disk0:/anyconnect-dart-win-2.5.2017-k9.pkg 1
svc enable
tunnel-group-list enable
group-policy DfltGrpPolicy attributes
webvpn
url-list value RFC
group-policy RFCLUB-EZVPN internal
group-policy RFCLUB-EZVPN attributes
wins-server value 192.168.1.207
dns-server value 192.168.1.207
vpn-tunnel-protocol IPSec svc
split-tunnel-policy tunnelspecified
split-tunnel-network-list value Split_Tunnel_ACL
default-domain value rfclub
nem enable
username ***** password ***** encrypted privilege 15
username ***** password ***** encrypted
username ***** password ***** encrypted privilege 15
username ***** password ***** encrypted
username ***** password ***** encrypted
username ***** password ***** encrypted
username ***** password ***** encrypted privilege 0
username ***** attributes
vpn-group-policy RFCLUB-EZVPN
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username ***** password ***** encrypted
username ***** password ***** encrypted
tunnel-group 75.145.121.41 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 75.145.121.41 ipsec-attributes
pre-shared-key rfclub-letmein
tunnel-group 173.164.39.77 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 173.164.39.77 ipsec-attributes
pre-shared-key rfclub-letmein
tunnel-group RFCLUB-EZVPN type remote-access
tunnel-group RFCLUB-EZVPN general-attributes
address-pool EZVPN-POOL
default-group-policy RFCLUB-EZVPN
tunnel-group RFCLUB-EZVPN webvpn-attributes
group-alias SSLVPN enable
tunnel-group RFCLUB-EZVPN ipsec-attributes
pre-shared-key rfclub-letmein
tunnel-group 173.14.13.25 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 173.14.13.25 ipsec-attributes
pre-shared-key rfclub-letmein
!
class-map global-class
match default-inspection-traffic
class-map GUEST-class
match any
!
!
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policy-map global-policy
class global-class
inspect ctiqbe
inspect dcerpc
inspect dns
inspect ftp
inspect h323 h225
inspect h323 ras
inspect http
inspect icmp
inspect icmp error
inspect ils
inspect ipsec-pass-thru
inspect mgcp
inspect netbios
inspect pptp
inspect rsh
inspect rtsp
inspect sip
inspect skinny
inspect snmp
inspect sqlnet
inspect sunrpc
inspect tftp
inspect xdmcp
policy-map GUEST-policy
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class GUEST-class
police input 2000000 1500
police output 2000000 1500
!
service-policy global-policy global
service-policy GUEST-policy interface GUEST
prompt hostname context
Cryptochecksum:f525f2f295465b8e274a9cd6c3415371
: end
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security planning. It outlines that switches are often overlooked as managers focus
mostly on the borders of LAN and forget about port locking and VLAN setting.
Myers, B. (2008) Connect to the Internet using your cell phone and laptop computer. Bill Myers
Online. Retrieved from
http://www.bmyers.com/public/938.cfm?sd=30
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The article provides a number of considerations to be made when using a cell phone
and laptop to connect to Internet. It includes tips when choosing a cell phone, a service
plan, Internet provider, and physical devices. The article provides an example with
Verizon service plan.
Ou, G. (2007). Essential Lockdowns for Layer 2 Switch Security. Tech Republic White Papers.
Retrieved from http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100-10878_11-6154589.html
The article provides information regarding layer 2 switch security. It present number of
security procedures that are essential in protecting layer 2 of the OSI model. Procedures
include SSH or Telnet remote connection, SNMP, VTP, and basic ports lockdowns, as
well as VLAN trunking management.
Ou, G. (2006, June 28). IP Subnetting Made Easy. Tech Republic. Retrieved from
http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100-10878_11-6089187.html
The article provides information about IP subnetting as a fundamental subject that is
critical for network engineers. The author uses a simple graphical approach to explain
the basics of IP subnets such as public IP, private IP, and subnet mask.
Pal, F. (2003). Configuration of Tunnel Mode IPSec VPN Using Cisco Routers. SANS GSEC
Practical Version 1.4b Option 1. Retrieved form
http://www.giac.org/certified_professionals/practicals/gsec/3402.php
The paper presents IPSec VPNs as secure method for organizations to share data over
the Internet. It provides step-by-step guide how to configure IPSec on Cisco routers
using manual key management and automated key management (IKE). The paper is
significant to the research with defining exact command lines for IPSec configuration
on Cisco routers.
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'06: Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Measurement.
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pei.pdf?key1=1177117&key2=1106691721&coll=ACM&dl=ACM&CFID=85482937&
CFTOKEN=99241540
The paper presents a systematic study of BGP convergence in MPLS Virtual Private
Networks. The authors state that invisibility problem in iBGP is the main factor for
convergence delays in VPN. They propose several configuration changes that can solve
this issue and improve the routing convergence time. The paper uses data from a large
Tier-1 ISP to provide accurate analysis and results.
Point-to-Point GRE over IPSec Design and Implementation (n.d.). Cisco Point-to-Point GRE
over IPsec Design Guide. Retrieved from
http://www.ccda.biz/en/US/docs/solutions/Enterprise/WAN_and_MAN/P2P_GRE_IPSec
/2_p2pGRE_Phase2.html
The paper provides comprehensive guide for designing and implementing VPN using
GRE over IPSec tunnel technology. It describes multiple considerations that need to be
taken in account during the design phase. The guide is significant to the research with
its information about how QoS, NAT, and firewall affect the VPN implementation.
Ramsey, M. (2000). PoPToP, a Secure and Free VPN Solution. ACM Digital Library, Linux
Journal, Volume 2000 Issue 74es. Retrieved from
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The article presents the Virtual Private Network (VPN) and its two main
implementation technologies PPTP and IPsec. It also describes the free PoPToP VPN
server for Linux which is widely accepted in business and home network environment.
Instructions on how to set PoPToP on Linux machine are included in the paper.
Site-to-Site and Extranet VPN Business Scenarios (n.d.). Cisco IOS Enterprise VPN
Configuration Guide, Chapter 3. Retrieved from
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/vpn_modules/misc/Archive_
6342/6342cmbo.html#wp1064626
The document is a comprehensive step-by-step configuration guide for implementing
site-to-site virtual private networks. It includes VPN tunnel, NAT, IPSec, QoS, and
firewall configuration as well as the exact command lines to do the configuration on
Cisco VPN gateways. The document is significant to the research with its detailed
information on how to set a VPN tunnel in site-to-site scenario.
Sustar, B. (n.d.). Designing Site-To-Site IPSec VPNs – Part 2. NIL IP Corner. Retrieved from
http://www.nil.com/ipcorner/IPsecVPN2/
The article covers GRE over IPSec tunnel configuration using crypto maps. It describes
how different routing protocols including RIP, OSPF, and EIGRP adjust to the VPN.
The paper also analyses the QoS possibilities in the GRE over IPSec tunnel which
makes it significant to the research.
The ABCs of Spanning Tree Protocol. (2006). Contemporary Conntrols, Info Sheet. Retrieved
from http://www.ctrlink.com/pdf/abc7.pdf
The paper presents the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) and its essentials including
possible issues and advantages. It discusses the stability problem in STP when a
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topology change occurs. Protocol timers and aging timers vary and it is impossible to
predict the recovery time window. The paper is valuable with its comprehensive
description of STP.

Venkatachalam, G. (2006). Developing P2P Protocols across NAT. Linux Journal, Volume 2006,
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34&key2=0570591721&coll=ACM&dl=ACM&CFID=85482937&CFTOKEN=9924154
0
The article introduces the basic issues with network address translation technology.
NAT is a problem for public Web hosting and FTP servers as well as P2P applications.
The author presents the UPD hole punching technique as a solution for NAT issues and
provides some details for its implementation. The article is helpful with its detailed
review of UDP hole punching.
Verlag, B. (2000). Economic Benefits of Standardization. DIN German Institute for
Standardization e.V. Retrieved from
www.din.de/sixcms_upload/media/2896/Economic%20benefits%20of%20standardizati
on.pdf
The article presents a research made by B. Verlag about the benefits of standardization
for business and the economic as a whole. It finds that company standards have the
greatest positive effect on business as they improve the business processes. On the
other hands the industry-wide standards have the greatest effect when it comes to
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relationship with suppliers and customers. The article also provides practical examples
of standards defined by international companies.
Welch-Abernathy. (2001, Dec 28). Network Address Translation. Inform IT Network. Retrieved
from http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=24661&seqNum=6
The chapter introduces the Network Address Translation technology. It explains what it
is, why it was created, and how it can be implemented in FireWall-1. It discusses the
possible problems in using the NAT with applications such as FTP, RealAudio, and
Microsoft Networking.

